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“Imagining The Trans-Mediterranean Republic: 
Algeria, Republicanism and The Ideological Origins of 
The French Imperial Nation-State, 1848-1870” 
 
Gavin Murray-Miller 
 
In August of 1857, runoff elections held in Paris confirmed the victory of five oppositional 
republican candidates to the Corps législatif, the parliamentary body that had served as a 
stronghold of conservative support for Emperor Napoleon III’s Bonapartist government since its 
creation in 1852. In histories of modern French republicanism, the election of Les Cinq has 
traditionally marked the commencement of the “republican renaissance,” a movement led by a 
new generation of lawyers, journalists and politicians committed to cleansing republicanism of 
its revolutionary ideology and fetish for political violence. In the last decade of the Second 
Empire, self-styled jeunes républicains (“young republicans”) touted a moderate brand of 
2 
 
republicanism that would, in time, come to provide the ideological foundations of the future 
Third Republic established on the ruins of the Bonapartist state in 1870. Scholars concerned with 
the origins of modern French democracy have frequently looked to the 1860s as a pivotal 
moment in the nation’s political history, insisting that republican ideologues at mid-century 
successfully focused attention on key issues concerned with decentralization, citizenship and the 
defense of civil liberties to draw support from liberals frustrated with Napoleon III’s 
authoritarian regime and, ultimately, make the idea of a republic palatable to French political 
elites.1          
If the details of the republican renaissance are well known, there remains another side to 
this story that is less familiar. As the ballots were being counted in August 1857, Jules Favre, one 
of the five republican candidates set to take a seat in the Corps législatif, surprisingly left the 
capital for the Algerian city of Oran to plead a case in the local cour d’assises, one of the French 
law courts set up in the colony to try criminal offenses. The trial in question involved Auguste 
Doineau, a captain in the Armée d’Afrique and commander of the Arab Office in Tlemcen 
charged with secretly ordering the assassination of a Muslim notable. Pleading his case before 
the Oranais court, Favre used the scandal to condemn the military regime and, by association, the 
imperial government, insisting that the Affaire Doineau exposed the authoritarian character of 
the colonial administration and its preference for personal power over justice and liberty.2 “If 
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what occurred in Tlemcen is indicative of all the Arab Offices,” Favre boldly charged, “then it is 
necessary to eliminate or profoundly reform them as quickly as possible.”3  
The tenor of Favre’s diatribe and the timing of his arrival in Algeria were not 
insignificant. With the entrance of Les Cinq into the Corps législatif set to give a political voice 
to republicans, it was essential to find issues capable of building an opposition platform and 
attracting reform-minded allies. Concerned with the progress of the nation’s “civilizing mission” 
being carried out in the colonies, Favre had come to Oran believing that Algeria could provide 
republicans with a possible forum for promoting their ideas and demonstrating their disapproval 
of the government. He even confessed that the ongoing debates over Algeria and the incessant 
grievances of colonial settlers held the potential of cementing a “common cause” between 
metropolitan democrats at home and disaffected Algerian colons across the Mediterranean.4 
From the very beginning of the republican resurgence the Algerian question comprised a facet of 
republican debate and discourse, proposing a political strategy aimed at integrating colonial 
concerns into the broader issues of liberty and state reform championed by republican 
spokesmen on the continent. 
Republican efforts to rally support in the colonies during the last decade of the Second 
Empire have largely been marginalized in historical accounts of the republican revival. In spite 
of the growing interest in French colonial history over the past two decades, limited attention has 
been given to the debates and discussions surrounding the subject of France’s empire before 
1870. Perhaps more troubling is the dearth of scholarship examining the relationship between 
French republicanism and the colonies prior to the Third Republic. Historians have typically 
looked to the late nineteenth century or the period following the First World War when assessing 
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the ideology and practices that came to define a republican brand of colonial rule anchored in the 
promise of emancipation, modernity and the assimilation of non-European populations to French 
cultural norms.5 Comparatively little has been said on how the empire impacted French politics 
and culture prior to the Third Republic or how republicans drew upon pre-existing ideas 
concerning assimilation and the “civilizing mission” to outline their own imperial agenda.6 The 
schema explaining the creation of la république coloniale has rested upon the successive 
construction of universalized imagined communities that shifted from “the nation” to a French 
“imperial nation-state”—La Plus Grande France, or “Greater France”—in the post-war period.7  
This supposed shift in the way the French community was imagined and reified is, 
however, problematic when applied to Algeria, a territory that was intimately connected to 
France by virtue of its proximity to the continent and sizeable settler population yet nonetheless 
inhabited by a Muslim majority. The ambiguous status of Algeria vis-à-vis the metropole prior to 
1870 subjected it to both national and colonial discourses, suggesting the extent to which 
colonialism was already becoming an integral part of French political culture in the post-
revolutionary period.8 Modern French republicanism came of age in a colonial world and it was, 
therefore, unsurprising that the nation’s colonial empire furnished republicans with a context for 
representing notions of universal citizenship and human rights central to their ideological 
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convictions. Under the Second Empire, republican elites tactfully employed “the Algerian 
question” to highlight the democratic charade of Napoleon III’s government and gave support to 
demands for citizenship and national integration vocalized by settlers overseas. In placing 
Algeria at the center of debates on the nation during the 1860s, republicans crafted an identity for 
themselves as defenders of law and justice against Bonapartist despotism, arguing in favor of the 
universal and democratic rights that formed the basis of a French national-imperial community.  
As a point of convergence for dual forms of national and colonial representation, Algeria 
offers valuable insight into question regarding how nineteenth-century Frenchmen reflexively 
understood concepts of nationality, citizenship and the relationship between the French 
metropole and its colonies. These issues first came to the forefront of national politics in 1848 
when the Second Republic enacted a policy of territorial integration (rattachement) that extended 
citizenship to Algeria’s French settlers and permitted Algerian deputies to sit in the National 
Assembly.9 While Napoleon III rescinded these policies after the coup in 1851, republicans were 
well positioned to associate themselves with colon concerns over rattachement, administrative 
assimilation and civil rights during the Second Empire and effectively used these issues to 
articulate and refashion conceptions of republican citizenship. Reaching out to the colonies 
provided a means of representing and instantiating the isonomic principles central to the 
“community of citizens” venerated by republicans since the late-eighteenth century. Yet it 
equally exposed the paradoxes lying at the heart of France’s republican democracy. While 
partisans of liberty in Algeria and France spoke in the name of universal citizenship and equality, 
their envisaged community of citizens never intended to include Algeria’s indigenous Muslim 
                                                 
9
 For works on Algeria and the Second Republic, see: Marcel Emerit, ed., La révolution de 1848 en Algérie (Paris: 
Larose, 1949); Benjamin McRae Amoss, “The Revolution of 1848 and Algeria,” The French Review 75:4 (March 
2002); 744-754; Yvette Katan, “Les colons de 1848 en Algérie: mythes et réalités,” Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine 31:2 (April-June, 1984): 177-202. 
6 
 
populations, as debates in both the colony and the Corps législatif during the 1860s would make 
clear.10 
The formation of a trans-Mediterranean opposition movement during the last decade of 
the Second Empire encouraged perceptions of a national community extending beyond the 
continent, yet this new national imaginary was hardly the sole invention of metropolitan political 
elites. Colonial journalists and critics played an instrumental role in promoting the idea of a 
common struggle against tyranny spanning from Paris to Algiers and consciously drew upon 
liberal and republican ideas regarding state power, administrative reform and citizenship in 
framing their calls for a French Algeria tied culturally and politically to the continent. 
Assessments of colon criticism have habitually overlooked the language of liberal-republicanism 
that informed settler grievances during the years of the Second Empire. The focus of attention 
has emphasized more salient themes of opposition to military rule, land access and 
administrative assimilation.11 Yet to simply interpret colon criticism in stark terms of conflict 
between military and civilian rule fails to take into account the specific ways in which colonial 
activists shaped and cultivated an oppositional identity for themselves. Many colonial 
polemicists depicted their struggle in terms specific to the new liberal-republican opposition 
emerging within metropolitan circles during the 1860s and successfully tailored metropolitan 
ideas to the unique contours and problems of colonial society. While these efforts were designed 
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to rally metropolitans to the colon cause, they equally served to place colonial grievances and the 
Algerian question within a larger framework of national concerns over state power, 
democratization and citizenship central to the metropolitan opposition.   
By the mid-1860s, French politics was assuming a conspicuous trans-Mediterranean 
character, one shaped and elaborated within the realm of the press and print culture. Algerian 
journalists, whether by cultivating ties to influential opinion leaders or reformulating liberal-
republican ideas within the context of colonization and the civilizing mission, directly and 
indirectly participated in debates on the French nation. The major metropolitan journals of the 
day commonly reprinted articles from Algerian newspapers while politicians kept abreast of 
colonial affairs and occasionally quoted from Algerian journals in public speeches. 
Transportés—radical workers and republican opponents deported to the colony between 1848 
and 1852—similarly played an instrumental role in disseminating liberal and republican ideas 
across the Mediterranean during the Second Empire, providing an important conduit between 
metropolitan political culture and Algerian settler communities.12 The increasing exposure the 
Algerian question received in the press and the making of a common political discourse rooted in 
demands for decentralization, civic participation and the development of an autonomous 
citizenry traced the contours of a dynamic trans-Mediterranean public sphere shaped through 
correspondence, journalism and social networks linking France and Algeria within a national-
imperial political culture. These various channels and networks would, over the course of the 
1860s, contribute to Algeria’s progressive entrenchments in metropolitan affairs and result in the 
creation of a republican state straddling the banks of the Mediterranean.   
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Studies on modern French republicanism and the origins of the colonial republic have 
minimalized the dialogue that took place between colonists and metropolitan politicians during 
the mid-nineteenth century. This oversight has favored a narrative largely stressing the primacy 
of metropolitan policymakers and elites while obscuring the significant role that settlers and 
colonial activists played in elaborating the ideas and practices that would eventually underpin the 
colonial republic.13 Retracing these trans-Mediterranean associations proposes a novel 
geographic and cultural framework for the study of nineteenth-century French politics and 
political culture. The circulation and exchange of ideas within a trans-Mediterranean context had 
a mutually transformative influence on democrats and reformers both at home and abroad. As 
colonial journalist and activists adapted the rhetoric and ideas of republican revivalism to their 
own program, metropolitan republicans and liberals revealed a willingness to envision the 
national community in new terms, demonstrating their commitment to democracy and extending 
the opposition movement into the colonial domain. It was through this confluence of diverse 
political strategies and objectives that the fundamental tenets and ideology of the colonial 
republic would take shape and crystallize into a policy of imperial expansion and domination 
consistent with the democratic values championed by French republicans.    
 
The Press and The Struggle Against Colonial “Officialisme” 
The emergence of a trans-Mediterranean political culture in mid-nineteenth-century France 
stemmed from the political realities associated with French colonization itself. Colonists had no 
direct political representation in the French government and, therefore, no direct influence over 
colonial policymaking. Subject to the authority of the Governor General and, ultimately, Paris 
and the whims of the Emperor, colonists protested against the lack of popular participation in the 
                                                 
13
 The marginalization of the outre-mer narrative in national historiography has been addressed by Jean-Pierre 
Rioux, La France perd la mémoire: comment un pays démissionne de son histoire (Paris: Perrin, 2006), 131-33. 
9 
 
drafting and execution of Algerian policies. “The administration consults itself in lieu of 
consulting the country,” the prominent Algerian lobbyist Jules Duval charged. “It risks severely 
mistaking its views for those of the colonists.”14 The colonial publicist Auguste Warnier was 
equally critical of the government’s authoritarian attitude, complaining in 1865 that “not a single 
colonist is asked for the slightest advice on questions concerning the future of the entire 
country.”15 The colonial administration’s supposed disregard for the needs and interests of the 
settler community became a centerpiece of colon opposition as reformers held the government 
accountable for the slow pace of the colony’s economic development, the troublingly low 
emigration rates, and the consistent misuse of public funds for grandiose and impractical 
building projects in the major cities of the Tell Atlas region.16  
If colonists could expect little sympathy from state and military officials, the same could 
also be said of metropolitan politicians and opinion leaders. In 1868, Akhbar’s Parisian 
correspondent chided the majority of deputies in the Corps législatif for the uninformed opinions 
and general disregard they revealed when it came to Algeria. “I do not fear I am going too far by 
claiming,” he reported, “that in the Chamber there are not ten deputies who are familiar with 
[Algeria] or have bothered to study it.”17 This disinterest similarly extended to national 
newspapers as well. “Practically no organ of the Parisian press seems disposed to discuss our 
interests,” journalist and republican transporté Wilfrid de Fonvielle lamented in 1860. “They 
assume that they are of no concern to the French public.”18 
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Unable to plead their case directly before the nation, colonists were obliged to rely upon 
metropolitan spokesmen to air their grievances, circumstances which necessitated courting 
public opinion and political allies through informal channels. This task, activists insisted, 
invested the colonial press with a specific mission and purpose. Journalists were obliged “to 
clarify public opinion and show things as they truly are,” Joseph Guérin, the Algiers notable and 
future mayor of Sidi Moussa, explained in 1865.19 Arnold Thomson, a regular contributed to the 
moderate Akhbar, was equally supportive of the role the Algerian press had in the colony, 
claiming the publicist was “to seek out and elucidate each one of the colonial questions and 
inspire thoughts in the diligent and intelligent part of the population.”20 By 1868, the radical 
Émile Thuillier commended the efforts of his colleagues, remarking, “Algeria is recruiting new 
defenders each day.” Yet he was also careful to reiterate the ongoing mission of Algerian 
journalism, reminding that “to draw people’s attention, it is first essential that they understand 
[the colony].”21 
The sense of unity and optimism conveyed by journalists often belied, however, a more 
complex reality. Censorship frequently made the hope of “clarifying” perceptions of Algerian 
society difficult. Colonial officials would fine or altogether suppress journals critical of the 
administration, imposing limits on the scope and tone of public discourse.22 The spectrum of 
opinion found in the Algerian press was, moreover, far from uniform. In addition to the official 
state organ, Le Moniteur algérien, the only fairly regular newspaper in the colony during much 
of the nineteenth century was Akhbar established in 1839 by Auguste Bourget. Bourget’s success 
was due primarily to his political flexibility and willingness to work within the acceptable limits 
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of public discourse set by the state without compromising the paper’s overall independence.23 
More censorious journalists often chided Bourget for his moderation,24 and comparatively short-
lived papers run by reform-minded liberals and anti-Bonapartist transportés like the radical 
republican Thuillier considered it a duty to maintain an oppositional stance reflecting explicitly 
colon interests and opinions. Journals like the Progrès de l’Algérie and Courrier de l’Algérie—
both of which tended to reflect republican attitudes—or Jules Duval’s fiercely pro-colon L’Echo 
d’Oran were typically the most critical of the colonial administration, and official efforts to mute 
criticism only further encouraged hostility. As one observer remarked in 1868: “Should you want 
to commend an act of state, send your prose to Le Moniteur or Akhbar; if you want to vent your 
spleen, send it to the Courrier . . . .”25 
Ideological differences aside, colonial journalists collectively saw themselves as 
spokesmen for settler interests and as mediators between the settler community and metropolitan 
policymakers. As opposition to the government’s policies grew during the 1860s, calls for 
“unity” and accord permeated journalistic discourse, prompting writers to publicize an identity 
for the European population inhabiting North Africa.26 Critics hostile to the colonial 
administration frequently made their case for civilian government by blandishing the patriotism 
and industriousness of the colon devoted to “the prosperity of the colony, to the grandeur of 
France and to the progress of civilization” in Africa.27 This image of the Algerian colon touted 
by polemicists tended, however, to obscure the diversity of a settler population consisting of 
aristocratic land owners, middling entrepreneurs and merchants, small-scale agricoles and 
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various insular immigrant communities.28 Colon signified a cultural rather than an explicitly 
social category, personifying the idealized French colonists inspired by an ardent love of the 
patrie and a dedication to progress and conquest with “a pickaxe in one hand and a gun in 
other.”29 A “pioneer of modern civilization” in the African wilderness, the colon became a 
familiar and salient image in newspapers and publications, providing an identity with which the 
settler community was expected to identify.30  
Praise for the resourcefulness and tenacious spirit of European settlers in Algeria often 
accompanied more pessimistic appraisals of the state and its excessive interference in nearly all 
aspects of public life. From the beginning of the French occupation, the colonial administration 
and its staff of civil engineers had spearheaded the various public work projects, urbanization 
initiatives and industrial ventures associated with Algerian modernization. Yet as various critics 
pointed out, these efforts could often be slow to materialize or incongruous with the practical 
needs of settler communities.31 Colonists habitually complained about state restrictions on land 
purchases and the persistent interference of authorities in the daily activities of settlers.32 During 
a visit to the colony in 1860, the dignitary Albert de Broglie opined that the values of “individual 
initiative” and the “spirit of enterprise” seemed feeble among the French settlers. Their “political 
institutions have,” he dismally concluded, “habituated [them] over the years to being governed, 
administered, controlled, supervised, and protected at all times and on all points.”33 According to 
Akhbar, nine years later little had changed. “It seems Algerians can do nothing without the 
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intervention of the government,” the journal claimed, “and this intervention is indispensable to 
the execution of projects.”34  
According to disgruntled colonists, constant bureaucratic oversight encouraged settlers to 
remain idle and reliant on the state, and the effects of this dependency were most pronounced in 
the settler communities outside the cities. In 1858, the young journalist Clément Duvernois 
sketched a depressing picture of rural colonial life, offering a tableau of poor farmers, barren 
fields, squalid towns filled with degrading cabarets and streets populated by children shirking 
work. Travelers who only visited Algiers and Constantine—cities that received the lion’s share 
of public funds and government attention—saw the newly laid roads and European houses and 
returned to France praising the administration’s progress. “But,” Duvernois countered, “if they 
even minutely examined the situation in the villages, they would lose the enthusiasm that had 
initially been inspired.” 35 Rural Algeria was characterized by isolation, fields dotted with small 
shanty farms, debauchery and penury, and this startling reality was the consequence of what 
Thuillier described as an egregious and ineffective “officialisme” smothering the colony.36 
“Here, where there is everything to be done,” Andrieux, editor and the Courrier, warned, “. . . 
centralization only serves to prevent everything from taking shape.”37 
Grievances over state policies were not merely complaints lodged against the colonial 
administration by angry settlers. The targets chosen by colons were strategic in nature and 
dovetailed nicely with the calls for decentralization emanating from prominent liberal and 
republican circles in the metropole. Critiques of centralization and demands for administrative 
reform were central components of the new oppositional discourse growing up in France during 
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the 1860s as political antagonists assailed the étatisme of the overbearing imperial bureaucracy 
and attempted to define a democratic polity capable of incorporating the majority of rural voters 
and transforming them into vigorous citizens.38 By the late 1860s, attacking Bonapartist 
centralization constituted a veritable mantra for all self-proclaimed partisans of liberty, rendering 
calls for decentralization and democratization a key source of unity for an opposition movement 
comprised of various political and ideological persuasions. “It has become quite common,” the 
journal L’Europe reported in 1865 when summing up the mood of growing discontent in the 
country, “to blame the prefects, to incriminate them on the slightest acts, to envelope all of them 
in a general condemnation.”39  
Algerian critiques of centralization were intended to portray the colony as an example 
par excellence of the shortcomings and impediments of the Bonapartist state and underscore the 
commonalities linking France and its North African periphery. The colon battle cry of “war on 
administrative centralization and bureaucracy!” was a sentiment shared by like-minded 
republican and liberal thinkers on the continent and such declarations encouraged an oppositional 
language that elided the conceptual boundaries traditionally distancing the metropole from the 
colony.40 Yet colon activists were not merely mimicking the familiar ideological discourse of 
their metropolitan counterparts. In ridiculing the “pernicious tradition” of centralization 
paralyzing the nation, colonial liberals and republicans consciously addressed prevalent concerns 
regarding state authority and the obstacles—whether real or imagined—believed to be 
detrimental to the health and vitality of colonial society. Frustrations over abortive state policies, 
economic underdevelopment and bureaucratic inefficiency stemmed from collective experiences 
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particular to Algerian society and colonialism, entailing that colon political ideologies were 
shaped by localized interests and circumstances just as much as by metropolitan political 
currents. Writing in 1858, Clément Duvernois expressed the popular colon sentiment that in 
Algeria the task at hand was “organizing a new country,” an undertaking that made 
decentralization and political reform all the more necessary.41     
Duvernois was emblematic of the new tone and outlook pervading liberal and republican 
critiques of Algerian colonization under the Second Empire. The son of a French emigrant, he 
had received a formal education at the lycée d’Alger before entering into a career in journalism 
where he quickly established a reputation for himself as a trenchant political and economic 
analyst. A self-identified liberal belonging “to the school of M. Guizot,” as he once confessed,42 
Duvernois attained notoriety through his persistent opposition to the illiberal and “arabophilic” 
policies of the colonial administration and his strong support for colon civil and political rights. 
In his opinion, the “principle of authority” could neither satisfy the needs nor meet the challenges 
required for Algeria’s social and economic development.43 The state’s authoritarian temperament 
and pathological mistrust of civil autonomy had transformed colonists into little more than 
fonctionnaires commanded by imperious officials as individual initiative and productivity were 
“absorbed by the abstraction of the state” and colonial society floundered.44 The way out of this 
morass was through administrative and political reform: the creation of a civilian government; 
representative institutions at the local and national level; and the development of a free and self-
reliant citizenry.45 “What is necessary to demand for Algeria is not that the state intervene,” 
Duvernois urged, “but, on the contrary, that [Algeria] be allowed a complete freedom of action in 
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the efforts of private industry.”46 Through his stringent attacks on the government, Duvernois ran 
afoul of the military regime and in 1860 his newspaper L’Algérie Nouvelle was suppressed and 
Duvernois imprisoned, prompting the fiery liberal to rail against the censorship policies that 
systematically undermined the freedom and integrity of the colonial press.47   
Duvernois’ contempt for centralization, his commitment to civil liberties and belief in the 
necessity of a free press were shaped and elaborated through his Algerian political engagements 
and fostered a liberal ideology informed through personal experience as much as political 
principle. Yet his liberalism was equally suffused with a Franco-Algerian nationalism stressing 
the complementarity of colonial and national politics. “Since the conquest,” he asserted in 1858, 
“political life in Algeria has been marked by numerous vicissitudes corresponding more or less 
to the events that have taken place in the metropole . . . . Algeria is not a colony. Nobody has 
considered it such for a long time.”48  For Duvernois, the world of colonial politics was never 
distinct from the world of metropolitan affairs and, as the course of his career over the 1860s 
demonstrated, the two could often be interwoven in real and vital ways.   
Through travel and correspondence during the 1850s and early-1860s, Duvernois situated 
himself at the nexus of an emerging trans-Mediterranean political culture by cultivating ties to 
prominent metropolitan opinion leaders such as Auguste Nefftzer, editor of the popular daily Le 
Temps, and the newspaper magnate Émile de Girardin.49 Settling in Paris after the closure of 
L’Algérie Nouvelle, Duvernois contributed articles to Le Temps on a semi-regular basis between 
1862 and 1864. Nefftzer, an influential publicist allied with the liberal-republican camp in the 
capital, openly gave his endorsement to the colon cause, deeming it “a movement whose 
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importance cannot be mistaken.”50 Armed with a major Parisian daily that reached a broad 
audience of educated, middle-class readers, Duvernois continued his attacks on the colonial 
regime unabated, apprising metropolitans of the issues central to Algerian colonization and 
urging a “new path” for French North Africa that would give a voice to the disenfranchised 
settler community.51 In the coming years, Le Temps increasingly dedicated greater attention to 
the Algerian question, whether by reprinting excerpts from the Algerian press, publishing articles 
written by Algerian polemicist or drawing attention to republican activities in Algeria and the 
Corps législatif.52  
Duvernois’ progressive entrenchment in metropolitan journalistic and political circles 
during the 1860s may have provided an opportunity for greater Algerian exposure in France, but 
it equally testified to the growing affinity between colonial and metropolitan political currents. 
Holding positions at various newspapers throughout the decade and fraternizing with political 
elites, Duvernois became a central figure in the liberal opposition by the end of the 1860s, 
winning a seat in the Corps législatif in 1869. During the final year of the Second Empire, he 
corresponded with republican Émile Ollivier to offer advice on the feasibility of liberal reform 
and decentralization.53 As his attention turned increasingly toward national affairs, his views on 
centralization, the press and civil liberties lost their explicit Algerian connotations in favor of a 
broad platform centered on emancipating the provinces from Parisian tyranny and “developing 
the public spirit.”54 “Without civil liberties, without the independence of the citizen, without the 
independence of the commune,” he warned, “a people enter into plain decadence . . . [and] each 
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day the sentiment of responsibility diminishes in the individual.”55 Despite the national scope of 
his envisaged reforms, the essential elements of Duvernois’ Algerian politic—the debilitating 
influence of centralization, the necessity of civil freedoms and the importance of individual 
initiative to social development—were unmistakable.  
In his transition from Algerian journalist to metropolitan politician, Clément Duvernois 
exemplified the intersecting trajectories that were coming to define colonial and national politics 
in the nineteenth century. If colons sough to appropriate the oppositional rhetoric familiar to 
metropolitan political elites in the hopes of integrating Algeria into the larger debate on the 
nation taking place in France, Duvernois revealed that the “war on centralization” was never 
strictly contained within the boundaries of metropole and colony and could even resist and defy 
such dichotomies. In emphasizing shared political concerns and experiences, critiques of 
centralization effectively provided colonial reformers with a means of challenging Algeria’s 
status as a colonial dependency through the recognition of a common political life binding a 
trans-Mediterranean French community. 
 
Algerian Municipalism, Citizenship and The Making of L’Algérie Française 
If attacks on centralization offered a common discursive framework for expressing frustrations 
with the imperial regime, they equally held the potential of uniting metropole and colony in other 
ways as well. Much like liberal and republican critiques of centralization, colonial assessments 
of state power were not only used to instantiate accusations of tyranny levied at the imperial 
regime; they also provided a context against which desires for liberal reform and democratization 
could be articulated. The language and ideology that accompanied the republican renaissance of 
the 1860s reflected changing conceptions of democracy and citizenship held by French political 
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elites at mid-century. The collapse of the Second Republic and Louis Napoleon Bonaparte’s use 
of universal manhood suffrage to buttress his authoritarian regime prompted liberals and 
republicans to reconsider certain core political beliefs, especially when it came to the obligations 
and responsibilities of a largely rural electorate in sustaining a democratic society.56  As the 
republican Étienne Vacherot explained, as long as “the political education of a people” remained 
incomplete, democracy could not be “fully realized” in France.57 “Democracy is not a natural 
phenomenon or the spontaneous product derived from the genius of a people or race,” he 
contended in 1859; “it is, like all political societies, and perhaps even more than other political 
societies, the slow and laborious work of civilization.”58 Efforts to transform the mass of 
enfranchised French voters into active citizens engendered a turn toward what the historian 
Sudhir Hazareesingh has labeled “republican municipalism,” a program aimed at promoting the 
nation’s “political education” through participation in local government and politics.59 The 
relationship between local liberties, civil society and citizenship outlined by young republicans 
provided, as Philip Nord has accurately noted, “the idea and . . . practice of democratic 
citizenship” that would remain central to modern French republicanism.60  
In editorials and political tracts, colons similarly drew broad parallels between the spirit 
of liberty, local autonomy and the practical work required for founding a prosperous and 
dynamic society in North Africa. Liberty, as founder of the Courrier de l’Algérie, Charles de 
Guerle, informed his readers in 1862, was “the only true principle underlying the drive and 
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progress of colonies.”61 “We ask for a greater freedom of action for our communes than in the 
mother country,” a colon petition submitted to the senate in 1863 explained, “because here 
everything has to be created and liberty is not to be feared, but is rather necessary in the struggle 
against the numerous obstacles that nature offers against the action of man.”62 Only free and 
autonomous individuals—self-professed “pioneers of modern civilization”—were aptly suited 
for the arduous task of founding a new and vigorous society in the colonial wilderness, and it 
was, therefore, unsurprising that reflections on liberty frequently translated into debates on the 
health and vitality of French colonial society tout court. In the opinion of one colonist, liberty 
was the most essential element in the growth and development of a settler community, warning 
that “without it, colonies wilt.”63 
 Much as in the French metropole, calls for Algerian liberalization elicited demands for 
reforms at the local levels of government, nurturing a brand of Algerian municipalism 
consciously tailored to the particularities of colonial society. Such considerations were, however, 
hardly exclusive to the colon opposition and remained tied to larger questions of centralization 
and state reform raised throughout the years of Bonapartist rule in France. The Emperor himself 
briefly flirted with the idea of administrative decentralization in the late 1850s, authorizing the 
creation of conseils généraux designed to reduce bureaucratic oversight and give Algerian 
notables more influence in local affairs. Yet Bonapartist reformers were never warm to the idea 
of democratizing the colonial government. Despite the fact that local councils were established to 
deliberate on departmental budgets and policies, councilors were personally appointed by the 
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Emperor rather than popularly elected.64 Frustrated over their exclusion from the Corps législatif, 
colons found exclusion at the local levels of the colonial government even more intolerable. 
Departmental and municipal affairs directly impacted the daily life and interests of settlers, 
especially when it came to the use of tax money. “Nation, department, commune,” the Courrier 
protested in 1865: “all are foreign to us and yet we must pay for everything these three councils 
vote on. Is that fair?”65 
Calling for further reform in 1862, Charles de Guerle stressed the importance of 
liberalizing the general councils in Algeria if the colony was to prosper and mature. “[We must] 
open our hearts and spirits to liberty through the free choice of general and municipal councils,” 
he implored, because it was at the departmental and communal levels that the decisions relevant 
to daily life were effectively made and implemented.66 De Guerle’s entreaty reflected a wide-
spread desire on the part of Algerian publicists in the early 1860s to combat the debilitating 
influences of state power by reinvigorating municipal life in the colony. Rather than constituting 
administrative entities akin to “companies and regiments” that knew only obedience, the 
Algerian municipalities would, the radical transporté Alexandre Lambert believed, be “reborn” 
through the participation of citizens and transformed into “vigorous unities sufficient in 
themselves.”67 Liberty and individual initiative, rather than being abstract concepts, made up the 
cornerstone of any healthy society, necessitating greater reflection on the more intimate contours 
of colonial life and government as well as the local institutions which shaped them. 
Under this program of administrative reform, colons attributed a particularly crucial role 
to the commune, the principal unit of French government. Much as the editor of the Progrès de 
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l’Algérie, Amand Favré, claimed, the commune was the essential base of social organization, the 
“natural nucleus” of society. “Thanks to the commune,” he continued, “men coming from 
diverse points can undertake the apprenticeship of association to which they are destined and 
freely unite their efforts against the obstacles of nature.”68 The senator and Algerian landowner 
Ferdinand Barrot readily concurred when addressing the senate in 1863, claiming the “municipal 
element” constituted “the first stage of all societies” and imparted the necessary education in 
self-governance and shared sociability without which society could not exist. In Barrot’s opinion, 
the municipality was “the first guarantee of interests, the first element of the spirit of association 
and solidarity.”69 As the foundation of all social life, the commune provided an indissoluble link 
between the individual and the community, serving as the locale upon which social and 
commercial transactions came to shape common interests and associations. De Guerle proffered 
a familial metaphor in 1862, describing the commune as an “enlarged family.” “Municipal life,” 
he affirmed, “is what touches us at all points and all moments of our life.”70 
The central role attributed to the commune extended, however, far beyond the domain of 
commercial and social engagements. Since the 1840s, colonial policymakers and colonists alike 
had contended with the problems posed by Algeria’s diverse social and ethnic makeup and 
expressed concerns over the prospect of unity in the midst of such a heterogonous population. 
The settler community comprised a mix of European nationalities which, when compared with 
the large indigène population consisting of Arabs, Jews, Turks and Berbers, constituted a 
minority of the colony’s inhabitants. The notion of l’Algérie Française was, in light of ethnic 
and cultural realities, an ideological fiction, yet one which nonetheless played a crucial role in 
both colonial policymaking and politics. Colons were among the strongest proponents of 
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francisation—administrative and cultural assimilation with the metropole—and musings on the 
role municipal government and the commune played in colonial life and society remained 
closely tied to concerns over the threat posed by ethnic and national diversity.            
Giving a speech before the conseil général of Constantine in 1865, the councilman 
Champroux expressed his support for communal organization in Algeria, believing it would 
mark a progressive step toward “a solid political and administrative organization” in the colony. 
It was not only advisable, but essential in his opinion, since the commune provided “the first link 
attaching [an individual] to a new patrie.” “In a colony composed of such diverse elements,” he 
maintained, “the commune becomes ever more necessary in suturing these elements.”71 Jules 
Duval shared a similar perspective: “the municipality becomes the principal patrie for the 
majority of inhabitants and on its horizon they concentrate their affections, activity, and 
ambitions.”72 The idea of l’Algérie Française, colonists claimed, must take root at the local level 
if it were to become a reality, and the commune was envisaged as the vehicle capable of shaping 
this French community on African soil.  
If the “municipal principle . . . must penetrate into the heart and blood of the population,” 
as Duval anticipated, the hope of encouraging Algerian national integration among the settler 
community also dictated cultivating the necessary “public mores” that would attach individuals 
to a free and democratic society. For Duval, the solution lay in allowing greater liberties at the 
municipal level through local elections. Municipal elections would provide the “education of the 
citizen” in the colony, nurturing an attachment to the patrie through civic engagement. “Without 
elections,” he warned, “[the people] will only see themselves as a cog in the central 
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administration estranged from their affections if not their interests.”73 In pleading his case for 
greater municipal freedoms in 1865, the liberal Montain-Lefloch argued that reform at the local 
level was paramount if colonists expected to obtain national representatives since it was through 
the commune that love for the patrie was born and the individual came to understand the 
“interests of the country.” In his final assessment, only “by proving that the fibers of the most 
vibrant patriotism runs in us as in the most humble peasant of France” would colonists win the 
right to elect deputies to the Corps législatif, and this could not be achieved without first 
liberating the communes from their administrative shackles and developing citizens.74  
As Montain-Lefloch’s critique revealed, a language of local government and municipal 
participation underpinned colonial demands for national integration and civilian rule. Opening up 
the communes and encouraging civic participation at the local level would generate, according to 
Arnold Thomson, an “awakening of the public spirit” in Algeria, cultivating an appreciation for 
democratic politics, patriotism and a shared sense of community.75 “There is neither a true public 
spirit nor a true love of liberty,” de Guerle admonished, “where one does not take an interest in 
the activities of the commune.”76 It was this “public spirit” which would, over time, became the 
lifeblood of an envisaged French Algerian society as the mix of nationalities and ethnicities 
scattered among the settler community came to see themselves as citizens united through shared 
interests and common aspirations. As Ferdinand Barrot put it in 1863, “the municipality [was] 
the mark of having attained the rights of citizens.”77 
Calling for democratic reform and the political rights enjoyed by French citizens in the 
metropole, Algerian activists nonetheless stood firmly against extending political participation to 
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Maghribi natives. French and European settlers made up a small minority in the midst of an 
imposing Muslim majority.78 In light of these troubling demographics, colons clearly understood 
the problems that free elections would pose to European influence in the colony and the future of 
a French Algerian society if voting rights were given to Muslims. Addressing the issue in 1867, 
the liberal Arnold Thomson expressed his fears that Muslims, Jews and foreigners would vote 
along ethnic lines, warning that such a denouement would inflect Algerian politics with deep-
rooted prejudices and hatreds.79  One councilman in Constantine went as far as to claim that 
proportionate representation and democratic politics would result in the “the despotism of 
material interests over moral interests” since to enfranchise the indigène majority would 
unquestionably mean abandoning the civilizing mission that ascribed a leading role to French 
and European colonists in Algerian society.80  
Questions of political inclusion and exclusion became central issues of debate during the 
1860s. It was undeniable that the political status of Algerian indigènes in the colony would have 
a direct impact on the question of overall national representation. Wary over the government’s 
growing nativist sympathies, Jules Favre decided to address the issue before the Corps législatif 
in 1870, candidly spelling out the problem enfranchising natives posed to Algerian national 
integration. If Muslims were allowed to participate in nominating deputies to the national 
legislature, he warned, France would be subject to an “invasion of the indigène element.” “If the 
indigène element should be represented,” he continued, “do you know how it will be? An 
indigène appearing in this body would be nominated by his co-nationals and would come to 
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defend the principle that they defend on their soil.”81 Giving Muslims political power would not 
only threaten to undermine the French character of Algerian society; it would also give them a 
voice before the nation, imperiling national unity and infecting national politics with a divisive 
tribalism. The deputy Léopold Le Hon was of the same opinion and argued that since Muslims 
were not subject to the French civil code they could not claim citizenship or any of the rights 
associated with it, which included nominating deputies to the Corps législatif.82 
Colon activists and their defenders employed a language of liberty and citizenship to 
frame the Algerian question and link it to the cause of metropolitan reform, asking, as Jules 
Duval did, what “difference in nature” existed between metropolitans and colonists to warrant 
violating the supposed universal rights guaranteed to all?83 In terms of Algerian Muslims, 
however, this difference was made plainly evident as accusations of native particularism elicited 
grave warnings of the racial and ethnic antipathies that would contaminate national politics were 
the “indigène element” to be given a voice. Republicanism’s rhetoric of universal and abstract 
rights was always conditioned by a discourse of national identification and the nation-state, 
equating nominally human rights with explicitly French rights.84 As colonial reformers 
confronted the dilemma posed by Algeria’s ethnic and national diversity, the status of non-
French and Muslim subjects could not escape the contradictions endemic to republican 
universalism, furnishing a justification for the exclusion of the vast majority of the Algerian 
population. Theorizing on the import and significance of colonial citizenship, colons and 
metropolitans rarely concealed desires for limiting the extent of political participation when it 
came to North African natives. From its conception, the idea of French Algeria rested upon 
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social distinctions between an elite French and Gallicized citizenry and a class of indigène 
subalterns bereft of political and civil liberties.85 
 Issues over the nature of citizenship and the extent of enfranchisement brought a host of 
xenophobic and racist perspectives to the surface in the late 1860s, and these outlooks were 
never divorced from the fundamental question of Algerian national representation. Yet if 
metropolitans could rest assured that the integration of Algeria would not mean an Islamicized 
electorate, it was still doubtful whether the imperial state would sanction colon enfranchisement.   
If Algeria received deputies in the Corps législatif, these representatives would be vehemently 
opposed to the government’s military policies. Why, therefore, would the Second Empire freely 
invite new members to fuel the growing opposition movement taking shape in the national 
legislature, one journalist speculated?86 If Algeria was to secure national representatives in the 
metropole it was evident that this aspiration could only come about through the victory of the 
liberal platform endorsed by the Bonapartists’ political rivals. The liberalization of the metropole 
was, colons inferred, intimately tied to the success of administrative reform and liberty in the 
colony, establishing the context for a trans-Mediterranean opposition movement oriented around 
a shared commitment to civic participation, decentralization and the rights of citizens. “Algeria 
will float on the wind, find itself year in and year out between different systems,” opined one 
critic in 1868, “. . . until the day when a freer France gives more liberty to the colony and 
consults it on the important question of colonization.”87 The journalist Paul Capdevielle summed 
up the situation more robustly the following year in his appeal to settlers to support the 
metropolitan opposition. “Our plight is . . . intimately linked to that of France,” he declared. “Its 
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triumph and its defeat will have here their inevitable corollary. Its interests are identical to ours 
and cannot be separated.”88 
 
Republican Politics and The Bridging of The “French Lake”   
If colons tied their hopes of reform to the success of the liberal-republican opposition in France, 
this conviction said just as much about colonists’ disillusionment with the Bonapartist Empire as 
it did about the relationship between French republicanism and Algeria. Since the 1840s, 
republicans had revealed a growing interest in France’s new colony across the Mediterranean. 
France possessed, republicans contended, a sacred mission to spread the revolutionary ideals of 
liberty and equality, and such pronouncements easily translated into support for the nation’s 
civilizing mission in Africa. Republican newspapers throughout the decade encouraged France’s 
“moral conquest” of North Africa, providing the first indications of a republican colonial 
ideology centered on Algeria and the Maghrib.89          
Following the revolution of 1848, the Second Republic implemented a series of 
administrative reforms that recognized the three northern provinces of the colony as de facto 
French departments and permitted colonists to elect deputies to the National Assembly. These 
gestures drew broad support from settlers who, throughout the 1840s, had increasingly promoted 
a policy of Algerian rattachement with the French nation on the continent and served to 
transform the revolutionary élan of 1848 into a collective experience uniting metropolitans with 
their colonial brethren across the Mediterranean.90 “Like our confrères [in Europe],” one 
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contributor to the Revue de l’Orient boasted that July, “we too have entered today into the 
domain of revolutionary realities.”91 This perception was only reinforced in the coming years as 
Parisians legislators authorized the transfer of some 12,000 French laborers to North Africa 
between 1848 and 1851. While the policy was conceived as a practical means of ridding urban 
centers of unemployed laborers and solving the troubling “social question” destabilizing the 
republic, colons welcomed the influx of new settlers needed to populate North African cities, 
assist with public works and contribute to the colony’s economic development and prosperity.92  
If the Second Republic’s Algerian policy nurtured a dedication to republicanism among 
the settler community, it equally served to make Algeria a pronounced theme within republican 
political discourse. As the republican deputy Charles Jacque Brunet explained when addressing 
the issue of Algerian colonization before the National Assembly, “Our revolution of 1848, whose 
principles are essentially pacific and fecund, can have for its theatre only a vast field of 
colonization on which to apply all the lively forces which ferment in our patrie [and] all the 
general instincts which lead France to become the apostle of civilization in the world.” Bruent’s 
cohort, the deputy Eugène Cordier de Montreuil, was of a similar persuasion, insisting, “Algeria 
is our raison d’être in this world for a people whose virtue has been otherwise extinguished and 
dead.”93 Espousing a patriotic and nationalist rhetoric, republicans contended that Algeria 
occupied a special place in the 1848 revolution and the republic it had founded. It was the field 
upon which the ideals and glory of a new republican France would be realized as it fulfilled its 
destiny and constructed a monument to its culture and civilization across the Mediterranean. 
While the “republican experiment” (to use Maurice Alguhon’s phrase) inaugurated in 1848 was 
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short-lived and the subsequent Bonapartist regime restored the colony to military rule in 1852, 
the years of the Second Republic marked the beginning of a new national and political discourse 
focused on Algeria which would increasingly become integral to the language and ideology of 
French republicanism. 
Although the jeunes républicains of the 1860s consciously attempted to distance 
themselves from the generation of quarante-huitards that had presided over the failed Second 
Republic, key spokesmen associated with the movement did exhibit a willingness to utilize the 
Algerian question to their own benefit and, in so doing, perpetuate a republican tradition. 
Seeking to build a broad opposition platform against Napoleon III’s imperial regime, republicans 
highlighted the illiberal and authoritarian practices of the Bonapartist state and championed a 
more open and democratic political system. Accusations of Napoleonic despotism proved, 
however, exceedingly difficult for opponents to substantiate in light of the Second Empire’s 
ostensible commitment to the ideals of the French Revolution and universal manhood suffrage. 
The brand of plebiscite democracy endorsed by the Bonapartists allowed the Emperor to appeal 
directly to the people over the elected representatives in the Corps législatif while officials used a 
variety of political strategies to manipulate mass democracy in local and national elections. 
Bonapartist proponents like the Duc de Persigny never failed to discredit the accusations of 
opponents by boasting that the government was in line with “the principles and ideas of the 
Revolution of 1789.”94  
Rivals set on laying bare the hypocrisy and pretensions of the detested regime tactfully 
focused attention on Algeria and the colonies where numerous Frenchmen lived bereft of the 
political rights that citizenship guaranteed. In an address before the Corps législatif in 1861, Jules 
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Favre made reference to the disenfranchised citizens currently living in France’s North African 
colony and accused the Second Empire of reneging on its supposed democratic principles, 
declaring, “the right to elect representatives belongs to all Frenchmen who reside on French 
territory.” He awaited the day, he continued, that the Algerian colonists could “march under the 
same banner” as their metropolitan compatriots and enjoy the common institutions and rights 
guaranteed to all French citizens. “Algeria and the colonies are French,” Favre proclaimed 
amongst a mixture of applause and hissing from the assembled deputies, “and I ask why they are 
placed beyond this common right?”95 “It is our principal argument, and we will not stop 
repeating it,” Jules Simon stressed nearly a decade later, “that our co-citizens of the outre-mer 
are, at this moment, deprived of their liberties.”96 Faced with such a flagrant violation of the 
nation’s revolutionary ideals, oppositional spokesmen insisted they were obliged to speak on 
behalf of their silenced compatriots scattered throughout France’s colonial empire, fashioning 
themselves defenders of “public opinion” and “unofficial representatives” of all Frenchmen 
suffering under the yoke of Napoleonic despotism.97  
Speaking in the name of disenfranchised Frenchmen not only offered opponents a means 
of contesting the Second Empire’s apparent commitment to democracy; it also served to 
construct a political identity for the opposition and the jeune républicain movement. Republicans 
maintained that their commitment to the colons was not motivated by personal interest but rather 
by a dedication to the universal ideals of unity, justice and democracy. It was not the Algerian 
cause which the deputies explicitly sought to defend, Ernest Picard claimed, “but the cause of 
rights and justice which desires that all parts of France be represented in [the national 
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parliament].”98 In construing support for Algerian liberty as a matter of conscience and principle, 
republicans sought to fashion a political identity for themselves rooted in respect for public 
opinion and liberal practices in contrast to Bonapartist tyranny. “You place force in the arbitrary 
while I put it in opinion and law,” Favre remarked sharply when confronting Bonapartist 
supporters in 1866. “You place force in the dictator while I put it in the regime of law.”99 Such 
arguments naturally extended to support for representative government and the influence of 
public opinion on political decision making, with opponents using their status as “unofficial 
representatives” of the colonial citizenry to indicate the necessity of overall liberal reform in 
France.  
Using the issue of Algerian representation to attack the democratic shortcomings of the 
imperial regime entailed, however, defining Algeria as part of the national body rather than a 
mere colonial appendage and affirming that Algerian settlers belonged to a French community 
extending beyond continental Europe. As the liberal Léopold Le Hon explained to his fellow 
deputies in 1870, “Algeria has a right to be represented [before the nation] and it will only see 
itself as completely French the day that its deputies come to sit amongst us.”100 Republican 
opinion leaders readily concurred, envisaging a national community of citizens that encompassed 
France’s North African periphery and the settler population. “France has always wanted to attach 
itself to Algeria,” Favre claimed, “and it has understood perfectly that these two earths separated 
only by a French lake should be united.”101 With the rise of a small but growing opposition 
movement in the Corps législatif during the 1860s, Algeria quickly became a debate on the 
French nation itself. The senator Ferdinand Barrot was not mistaken when in 1863 he claimed, 
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“The Algerian question is posed in daily polemics with an eminently national character.”102 If 
Bonapartist statesmen extolled the government’s respect for national sovereignty and democratic 
politics, republican and liberal deputies saw fit to correct this misrepresentation by re-
conceptualizing the contours of the nation and using the plight of Algerian colonists to expose 
the contradictory claims and practices that buttressed Bonapartist power. 
Raising the issue of colonial citizenship outfitted republicans and their political allies 
with a means of contesting the Bonapartists’ liberal and revolutionary identity. Yet such 
indictments rested upon the assumption that Algeria was a de facto component of the national 
body, an assumption which was hardly shared by all.103 Efforts to portray Algeria as a symbol of 
Bonapartist despotism and hypocrisy prompted opponents to associate their own demands for 
liberty at home directly with the colonial opposition, reiterating the notion put forward by colon 
journalists of a common political cause linking France and North Africa. The issue of French 
liberty and the Algerian question were, critics urged, two sides of a larger national resistance 
movement against arbitrary rule and power. Professing his support for the liberalization of 
Algeria’s general councils in 1869, Favre tellingly inscribed the issue within a larger national 
context, claiming that subjecting departmental councils to free elections would realize “that true 
liberty which it is necessary to assure in Algeria as in France.”104 “Algeria has constantly 
protested and protests still against personal power,” he maintained in 1870, “and in this it has 
followed the movement of France in its sentiments, thoughts and aspirations, and its heart has 
beat with ours.”105 Much like Favre, Jules Duval asserted that the Algerian resistance symbolized 
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nothing less than “a new episode in the struggle between centralization and liberty” which had 
characterized French politics since the Revolution.106 
In making appeals to a common opposition movement spanning France and North Africa, 
republican critics gave substance to the idea of a trans-Mediterranean French community united 
through its resistance to tyranny and shared dedication to liberty. Having tailored the language 
and issues of the metropolitan opposition to the contours of colonial society, Algerian publicists 
had provided republicans and liberals in France with a context for integrating the Algerian 
question into the political program championed by the jeunes républicains and their allies. Yet if 
the ideas of the republican renaissance exercised an influence on how colons understood and 
conceptualized their own plight, their efforts to integrate colonial concerns into national debates 
similarly influenced republican discourse in vital ways. “Nationalizing” the Algerian question for 
the sake of immediate political objectives, republicans effectively de-territorialized French 
identity by inscribing it within a broader framework of rights, citizenship and emancipation. In 
taking on the Algerian question, French elites came to imagine the nation within new geographic 
and conceptual boundaries, envisioning an expansive French community of citizens transcending 
the territorial limits of the metropole. This vision would, in time, constitute the base of the 
“French imperial nation-state” and become an essential feature of the colonial ideology endorsed 
by the Third Republic.     
       
Trans-Mediterranean France and Its Implications for French Republicanism  
In June of 1869, Akhbar saw fit to comment on the growing momentum of the opposition 
movement spanning Algiers and Paris, asserting that an “uninterrupted current of people and 
affairs . . . [and] a constant exchange of ideas and sentiments” now existed between France and 
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Algeria. “Are there really two countries?” the newspaper asked. “Are they not rather different 
members of the same body, receiving life and pulsating movements from the same heart?”107 
This question would be answered just over a year later when Napoleon III’s misguided foreign 
policy provoked a war with Prussia that brought down the Second Empire and paved the way for 
the establishment of the Third Republic. In October of 1870, republican leaders met with an 
Algerian delegation in Tours and willingly agreed to all the demands made by the colon 
representatives. The military regime was abolished in favor of a civilian administration, 
independent Muslim councils were suppressed and the settler community was granted the right 
to elect deputies to the National Assembly, effectively recognizing l’Algérie Française as an 
integral part of the French nation.108 If the political language and discourse of republicanism had 
provided the context for conceptualizing a trans-Mediterranean French nation since 1848, the 
new republican leadership showed itself eager to translate this national imaginary into an 
administrative and political reality. 
The realization of the trans-Mediterranean French republic created in 1871 was the 
product of the accord and consensus that had developed between metropolitans and colons 
during the years of the Second Empire. In adapting the rhetoric of liberal-republican opposition 
to the particularities of colonial Algeria, colon activists successfully managed to elaborate a 
common language and discourse through which to address administrative concerns and express 
their political grievances. The insistence on a shared political culture and experience lying at the 
heart of colon discourse furnished an intimate link binding metropole and colony, diminishing 
the conceptual gap between continental France and the French Orient that had complicated the 
issue of Algerian national integration in the past. More than simply complaints against 
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authoritarian military rule, colon opposition drew upon and incorporated the language of 
moderate republicanism to construct a new national imaginary that encouraged a more expansive 
idea of the French community and reinforced the conception of l’Algérie Française central to 
colon aspirations. Goaded by political necessities at home, liberal and republican elites readily 
gave credence to this vision in an effort to build a common opposition front, endorsing the idea 
of a community of French citizens that, in time, would reinforce the notion of a French imperial 
nation-state supported by the Third Republic. 
For a republic that conceptualized itself in both national and imperial terms, colonialism 
was, by necessity, an important facet of republican culture and state ideology. This consequence 
not only indicates the central role that France’s Algerian experience played in the development 
of modern French republicanism, but equally challenges assertions that the colonial republic was 
a metropolitan enterprise directed by French political elites in Paris. Rather than a byproduct of 
modern French republican thought, republican colonial ideology constituted an integral 
component of the republican revival and the subsequent state it founded. The making of colonial 
republicanism was the result of a dialogue between metropolitans and the settler community as 
colons tailored republican ideas to fit the contours of colonial society. It was through this process 
of adaption and modification that the tenets and practical strategies guiding the republican 
“civilizing mission” would emerge and solidify into a brand of imperial rule and expansion 
consistent with republican values and principles. The tendency to marginalize peripheral 
influences in favor of a metropolitan-centered French history has often obscured these more 
nuanced and complex understandings of nation-building, French identity and republican 
democracy. Placing France within a trans-Mediterranean context marks an important step in 
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reconfiguring French cultural and political history within novel geographic and conceptual 
parameters. 
If the Algerian municipalist movement and reflections on colonial citizenship 
foreshadowed the power relationships and mentalities that would structure the future colonial 
regime, it is also profitable to note that the Algerian question marked the beginning of French 
republicanism’s troubling relationship with Islam and Muslim culture that persists in French 
society to this day. Recent scholarship focused on the relationship between France and Islam has 
addressed the challenges that the French republic faces in coming to terms with cultural 
pluralism, diversity and the impact of globalization.109 Fears that immigration and especially 
Islam pose a significant threat to French culture and identity have become the principal caveat of 
right-wing nationalists touting such xenophobic slogans as “France for the French” and warning 
of the nation’s impending transformation into an “Afro-Mediterranean country.”110 These 
concerns are, however, hardly a post-colonial phenomenon and have their proper roots in 
France’s experience of administering and assimilating the Maghribi populations that inhabited its 
North African periphery. Long before disputes over immigration and its threat to French identity 
were considered pressing subjects of national debate, French republicans stood opposed to what 
Favre described as the invasion of “the indigène element.” If the generation of the 1860s and 
1870s is considered the forefathers of the modern French republic, then it is evident that the 
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tension between Tricolor and Crescent marks a fundamental and sustained element of French 
republican thought and culture that has yet to be reconciled.111  
 
                                                 
111
 I borrow this term from William E. Watson, Tricolor and Crescent: France and the Islamic World (Westport: 
Praeger, 2003). 
